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Michael Gagarin
The University o f Texas at Austin

The Truth o f Antiphon's Truth
My intention in this paper is to explore some of the implications o f the fact that the fifthcentury sophistic thinker Antiphon entitled his main "sophistic" treatise, published in two books.
Truth (Alêtheia ). As in the case o f Protagoras' treatise o f the same nam e,1 this title may be
understood as an indication that Antiphon is responding to Parmenides' "Way o f Truth" and is
affirming his own view o f the truth about the world, that physis is more real of truer than
nom os, or in other words, statements are true if and only if they correspond to physis, but not to
nomos. I have no quarrel with seeing Antiphon's Truth as in some respect a response to
Parmenides, but I think the relationship between the works o f these thinkers is more complex, and
these titles raise fundamental questions about what each author, and their contemporaries,
understood by "truth."
Now it is evident that in several places in the extant papyrus fragments o f Truth (DK B 44)
the word alêtheia implies a straightforward relationship o f correspondence between truth and
reality.2 Indeed, a correspondence view o f truth was standard in most Greek authors up to
Antiphon's day, and orators in particular frequently talked about "truth" in an apparently
straightforward sense of "correspondence to reality." In choosing the title Truth, however,
Antiphon may intend to suggest something more than a simple correspondence between his logos
and an external reality. I shall suggest that he is also exploring the possibility that both logos itself
and the ’’reality" to which a "true" logos corresponds are complex and ambiguous, and that as a
consequence the nature of truth is not a simple correspondence. There is thus a certain irony, or at
least an intentional ambiguity, in the title Truth: the truth of Antiphon's Truth is, in my view, that
there is more than one truth and that a true logos must somehow comprehend a number of
different truths.
Obviously this thesis will need to be defended primarily with respect to the text o f the
surviving fragments of Truth, but before I turn to these, it will help to consider some evidence
from other Greek authors and from other works o f Antiphon. This sense of the ambiguity of
language and of reality that I am postulating for Antiphon's Truth c m be found, I think, as early as
Hesiod. I am not referring primarily to the famous lines in the Theogony (27-28), where the Muses
tell Hesiod they know how how to tell lies that are like the truth but also how to sing the truth
(alêthea) when they wish. It is possible that in these lines "truth" is ambiguous, but I am not fully
persuaded that Hesiod is doing more than asserting the privileged status o f truth and in some sense
claiming this status for himself. More interesting with regard to the truth is the opening o f the
Works and Days. Hesiod ends the short prologue in line 10 with the assertion, "I would speak the
truth. Perses," and this is followed immediately by the famous declaration that there is not one eris
("strife") but two, one good and one evil. After this apparently unequivocal opening, however, the
clear dichotomy between the two poles o f good and evil with which the passage opens is undercut
in the lines that follow,3 and it becomes evident these poles collapse into one another. Hesiod’s
point seems to be that the ambiguity of the word eris (and there are other such words in the poem)
corresponds to a similar ambiguity in the real world, where the division between strife and
striving, between good and evil, constructive and destructive competition, ultimately breaks down.

1 The title Alêtheia is given only by Plato. Since it clearly serves Plato's purpose in the context
o f the Theaetetus, it has been argued that the title is Plato's own invention (see Untersteiner, vol. 1, p. 72).
There is no such uncertainty with regard to Antiphon's title. We have no good evidence for dates o f
Protagoras' and Antiphon's treatises, but the consensus is that Protagoras' work is the earlier. A recent
plausible interpretation o f Antiphon's views on morality and self-interest (see Nill) takes them to be a
response to Protagoras.
2 Three times in fragment 44C Antiphon refers to giving "true" testimony.
3 1 have discussed this passage at greater length in Cabinet of the Muses.

W ord and world, logos and pragm a, do indeed correspond, in the sense that both embody a
similar ambiguity.
On my reading o f this passage Hesiod is fully aware o f these implications concerning the
ambiguous nature of language and reality and the correspondence between the two. He may also
have a sense that the coherence o f a logos is am important element o f its truth. It is also plausible,
though we hardly have enough evidence to assert it, that the idea that truth might be ambiguous
was a significant element o f Protagoras' thought, and this may help to explain the genesis of
statements later interpreted to mean such things as "contradiction does not exist," "it is impossible
to tell a lie," etc. Consider the dual title that has come down to us for Protagoras' main work: Truth
(A lêtheia) or Overthrowing Arguments ( Kataballontes , sc. Logoi). The second title implies a
struggle, an agón between more than one logos, and the plural number and present tense of the
participle seem to imply that different logoi may win different "throws,"4 but no single logos
necessarily emerges the final victor. The competition is "ongoing." Protagoras' title would clearly
and directly have challenged Parmenides' "Way of Truth," not only by asserting the primacy of
humanity (anthrôpos) as a standard of reference, but by asserting a different view o f truth. In the
"Way o f Truth" Parmenides had radically severed truth from reality, confining all negativity to the
"Way o f Appearance" (Doxa). In so doing, for the first time he made the truth depend solely on
coherence.5 The truth o f Parmenides' "Way of Truth" has nothing to do with its correspondence or
lack of correspondence with reality, but is a product only o f its internal logical structure. My
reading of the sophists is that they employed the standard o f coherence in determining the "truth"
of a logos, while not abandoning the idea o f correspondence between logoi and reality.
Competing logoi might reflect an actual ambiguity in reality.
Before coming to the surviving fragments of Antiphon's Truth I next want to pause briefly
to consider some ideas about truth found (both explicitly and implicitly) in the Tetralogies ascribed
to the orator, Antiphon of Rhamnous. My use of the Tetralogies to illuminate the sophistic work
Truth relies in part on my acceptance of two assumptions: that the orator and the sophist are, in
fact, the same Antiphon, and that the Tetralogies are genuine works o f the orator. Both
assumptions have often been denied, but both seem to me to be gaining ground in recent years
(though not without dissenters). I cannot, of course, fully support either assumption here, but let
me briefly indicate my reasoning. I should add, that as long as the Tetralogies are accepted as
sophistic or rhetorical works of the second half o f the fifth century—that is as expressions of the
thinking of the period-it is legitimate to use them to illuminate another work o f the same period,
namely Truth, even if their author was not the sophist Antiphon.
The name Antiphon was fairly common in Athens and elsewhere and we know with
certainty of several later political figures and a tragic poet who cannot have been the same man as
our sophist. But the ancient tradition is overwhelmingly in favor o f identifying the orator and
sophist; the rare dissenters argued on stylistic grounds alone and apparently had no further
evidence to support their opinion.6 In modem times the separatist position was considerably
encouraged by the new papyrus fragments discovered early in this century. In particular, the
beginning o f what is now numbered 44A (= 44B DK; see n. 24 below), though variously restored
by scholars, was commonly understood to present a strongly egalitarian view o f human society
that was quite incompatible with the known aristocratic life and political tendencies o f the orator,
moreover, the sophist's apparent criticism of the judicial process evidently conflicted with the
orator's frequent statements in support of the laws and the courts. It was thus inconceivable to
many that the same man could have written both sets o f works.7 These points have been answered
in various ways (e.g., expressions o f support for the legal process in a courtroom speech are
scarcely evidence for the speaker's—let alone the speech writer's—personal view o f justice), but the
4 The Greek metaphor is from a wrestling match.
5 Earlier thinkers like Xenophanes and Heraclitus (if he was earlier) may have developed elements
o f a coherence theory o f truth, but Parmenides clearly takes it far beyond any o f his predecessors.
6 See Gagarin in GRBS . Decleva Caizzi (1984) reviews scholarship on identity.
7 This view is perhaps most strongly expressed by Luria.

-

2

-

strongest counter-argument has been provided by a recent papyrus find (POxy . 3647). This short
fragment contains only a dozen lines of complete text (44A, col. 3), which add little to our
understanding of Antiphon's ideas, but much more importantly it provides a few letters from the
ends o f lines in the preceding column, and these conclusively disprove all earlier restorations of the
beginning of 44A and eliminate the radical egalitarianism that had hitherto been assumed there.8
Thus at this point the major obstacles to the Unitarian view have been eliminated and the traditional
Unitarian view is beginning to dominate.9
Nothing so dramatic has affected debate over the authenticity of the Tetralogies. The ancient
tradition gives no hint that their authenticity was ever doubted in antiquity. In modem times the
case against their authenticity was most strongly pressed at the end o f the last century; but
currently, despite lingering questions about certain details, there seems to be growing agreement
that they are works of the sophistic period and as likely to have been written in Athens as
anywhere, in which case there is no good reason to deny the ascription to Antiphon.10 True, the
stylistic differences between these and Antiphon's other three surviving speeches are considerable,
but since the Tetralogies are clearly a different genre, served a different purpose, and may have
been composed a couple of decades or more before the courtroom speeches, such differences are
perhaps not surprising.11 My own view is that Antiphon (who died in 411) was an Athenian
intellectual, contemporary with Socrates, who was interested in the whole spectrum of "sophistic"
issues in the second half of the fifth century, and whose special area o f expertise was oratory and
the courts. I take the Tetralogies to be sophistic exercises (in some sense) that use the model of a
courtroom contest (agón) to explore different arguments on various issues that are relevant not
only to legal cases but also to other sorts of competitive logoi (those intellectual competitions
mentioned by Gorgias in Helen and scorned by Cleon in the Mytilenean debate).
As I see it the main issue in the First Tetralogy is the relationship between truth and
"probability," and in the Second Tetralogy the relation between error, causation and responsibility.
These same interests would explain why so much of the content o f the papyrus fragments o f Truth
(which represent the majority of what survives from that work) is devoted to questions o f law and
justice. To see all these works as the product o f a single person is in my view eminently plausible,
though to be sure not provable.
In considering what the Tetralogies can tell us about truth, I shall confine my remarks to the
first two Tetralogies, which are the most interesting in this regard. The First Tetralogy presents a
relatively straightforward dispute about a question of fact: did the accused kill the victim or is
someone else the killer? The exercise is constructed in such a way that the direct evidence, which
consists o f the reported testimony of an eye-witness, supports a guilty verdict but is not
conclusive, so that Antiphon can explore the various arguments involving eikos—"probability" or
"likelihood." The plaintiff argues that there is no other likely suspect and that because of his
previous dealings with the victim, the defendant is in fact the most likely suspect. The defendant
must be guilty, since both the direct evidence and the likelihood point to him. The defendant
responds that the direct evidence is doubtful (it comes from the victim's slave who died
immediately afterward, who cannot have had good grounds for his testimony, and who did have
reason to implicate the defendant) and that many others are more likely than he to have killed the
man. In his second (and last) speech he also adds an alibi to show "not in likelihood but in fact"
(ούκ έκ τω ν εικότων ά λ λ ’ εργφ, 2.4.8) that he could not have been the killer.
Now, the standard response to the large use o f probability arguments in early Greek
rhetoric was laid down once and for all time, so it seems, by Plato. For a recent statement of the
8 See D ecleva Caizzi’s new edition and most recently Ostwald. Note that even before these new
discoveries, a few earlier scholars (e.g., Moulton 344-45) had cautioned that the idea o f class differences
rested entirely on hypothetical textual restorations.
9 E.g. Barnes, Cassin, Decleva Caizzi and Ostwald.
10 See especially Decleva Caizzi's edition of the Tetralogies', contra Sealey.
11 See esp. Dover. The courtroom speeches are probably all from the last decade o f Antiphon's life
(i.e. ca. 420-411).
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response, let me quote, exempli gratia, Guthrie: "The essential theoretical basis o f rhetoric was that
which distinguished it from the beginning,. . . namely that 'they held the probable (or likelyseeming, plausible, eikota) in more honour than the true."'12 Guthrie is quoting from Phaedrus
267A, where Plato ridicules the work of earlier and contemporary rhetoricians. But we should not
be misled by Plato's authoritative treatment o f the subject and should recall instead his well known
hostility to rhetoric. For in fact, Plato's assessment is to say the least very misleading.
It may be accurate to say that likelihood was a basis o f rhetoric, and perhaps even that it
was an essential basis. This would not be inconsistent with the implications o f a passage in
Gorgias’ Helen (11), where he argues:
For if all men on all subjects had memory of things past, <understanding> o f things
present, and foreknowledge of things to come, logos would not be similar in
similar fashion;13 but as it is, it is not easy to remember the past, or to examine the
present, or to prophesy the future, so that most men on most subjects make opinion
(doxa) an adviser to their mind. But opinion, being perilous and uncertain, leads
those who use it into perilous and uncertain prosperity.
Gorgias implies that under actual conditions of at least partial ignorance likelihood will play a large
role in the opinion men rely on, but this is a far cry from saying that likelihood or opinion is held in
more honor than truth. Rather, this passage of Gorgias in fact implies a clear preference for the
truth, when it is knowable. But the sophists and orators recognized that it often is not knowable
(and these are the cases that will most likely end in litigation in court), and so they train themselves
in the use o f arguments from likelihood and in other devices for swaying human opinions.
This attitude is clear in the First Tetralogy, where the fictional situation is carefully
constructed so that direct evidence for the truth is not conclusive and the litigants are compelled to
seek the truth by means of eikos arguments. The plaintiff begins by apologizing for his use of
eikos arguments, which are necessitated by the difficulty o f knowing what happened in cases like
this (2.1.1-2). Later the defendant argues that if the plaintiff is going to consider likelihoods equal
to the truth, then he too should be allowed to do the same, and since the likelihood in fact supports
his side, he should be acquitted (2.2.8). This is not an assertion o f the primacy o f likelihood, but
indeed just the opposite. It implies that factual truth is normally primary but that the plaintiff in this
case has wrongly equated likelihood with truth.
The defendant begins his final speech by asserting that he is trusting in "the truth o f the
things that were done by me" (τρ ά λη θεία των έξ έμου πραχθέντω ν, 2.4.1). This and similar
expressions with the verb prassô (often in the passive voice) imply that there exists a "factual
truth" (i.e. a single truth corresponding to the facts) which, if known by all, would settle the
matter. The same implicit view of truth and likelihood underlies the defendant's presentation o f his
alibi, which proves his innocence "not in likelihood but in fact" (ούκ έκ των εικότων ά λ λ ’ εργφ,
2.4.8). In my view the alibi is introduced after all the eikos arguments as Antiphon's way o f
saying that in the end a direct knowledge of the truth will overwhelm arguments from likelihood,
which only have force when the truth is not known.
In the First Tetralogy "truth" designates a statement that corresponds to the pragm ata, to
what really happened. A somewhat different view of truth emerges from Antiphon's Second
Tetralogy, which in my view was written as a companion piece to the First Tetralogy. In the
Second Tetralogy a boy has died after being hit by a javelin thrown by a youth during a training
session. The boy's father argues that the youth is guilty o f unintentional homicide, which in
Athenian law was punishable by exile for one year. The youth's father replies that the boy caused

12 The Sophists (Cambridge 1971) 180. For other versions see, e.g., George Kennedy, The Art of
Persuasion in Greece (Princeton 1963) 32, and even Brian Vickers, In Defense o f Rhetoric (Oxford 1988)
69-70, who in general argues strongly against Plato's view of rhetoric.
13 The text is uncertain here.
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his own death by running out in front of the javelin at the wrong time; thus the boy is in essence
his own killer, and as a result the killer has in fact already been punished!
The plaintiff in the Second Tetralogy begins his case by drawing a distinction between
those cases where the facts (ta pragm ata) are agreed on and those where they are in dispute,
adding that in this case he expects no dispute. He then presents a simple statement14 o f the facts of
this case (3.1.1): "my boy, struck in the side by a javelin thrown by this youth on the playing field,
died on the spot. Therefore I charge him not with intentional but with unintentional homicide." As
predicted, the defendant does not dispute these facts but he does offer instead a radically different
statement o f the truth of these prag m ata (3.2.3): his son "did not kill anyone, according to the
truth o f what he did ( κατά γε την αλήθειαν ων επραξεν)." Although this is essentially the
same expression as cited above from the First Tetralogy, the truth sought here is different. Here the
truth is not a direct statement of facts ("he killed the man") that competes with an alternate statement
("he did not kill the man") to determine which corresponds with reality, but rather an interpretation
of or judgment about a given set of facts that competes with an alternate interpretation of the same
facts.15
Now this "interpretative truth" proposed by the defendant in the Second Tetralogy cannot
depend solely on its correspondence with reality, since the plaintiffs truth also corresponds with
the same reality. Nor is the defendant's truth, like Parmenides', solely a function o f coherence, as
he immediately makes clear with a hypothetical argument (3.2.4): "If die javelin had hit and
wounded the boy because it carried outside the boundaries o f its proper course, then we would
have no argument (logos) against the charge of homicide." In other words, if die reality was
different, his logos would necessarily be different. In short, each speaker's logos must
correspond to the facts, but in this case correspondence alone cannot be a sufficient criterion for
"the truth o f the events."
The Second Tetralogy thus presents two opposed truths, each o f which corresponds with
reality, but only one of which will win the jurors' verdict. As the defendant tells the jurors at the
beginning of his second speech (3.4.1-2): "your task is to recognize that we litigants are likely to
judge die matter by favoring our own side (k at’ eunoian) and each o f us is likely to assume his
case is just; but you must view the events with a righteous mind, for their truth (hê alêthela
au tô n [sc. to n p rach th en tô n ]) is only discernable from what is said (ek to n legom enôn)."16
The implication is that the truth of this case (the "jurors' truth"?) is determined from the logoi of
each side, and will depend at least partly on the coherence o f the two logoi. In other words, from
two different logoi a single truth will emerge which best meets the test o f coherence, while still, of
course, maintaining its correspondence with reality.
W e should bear in mind, however, that this "jurors truth" would emerge only if the
Tetralogies were actual court cases. In Antiphon's fictitious cases no verdict is rendered. It appears
that his purpose is not to help the reader determine the (single) truth o f each case, but rather to
show them how to present the truths of different sides of the case. And our ultimate judgment of
the truth of the Second Tetralogy may be that the truth o f the whole work lies not in the logos of
either litigant by itself, nor in some ultimate verdict rendered by the imaginary jurors, but rather in
a dialectical tension between the two arguments. Just as in Hesiod's description o f eris the
apparent polarity of good and evil collapses into a complex ambiguity where the same eris is both
14 For the style o f this sentence in comparison with the more elaborate style o f the rest o f the
argument, see Zuntz.
15 Similarly, Gorgias defends Helen in His speech not by arguing for an alternate set o f facts (as
had been done by Stesichorus in his Palinode and others) but by proposing an alternate interpretation o f the
standard version o f the facts, namely that Helen sailed to Troy with Paris, thereby causing the Trojan War.
It may be helpful to compare the distinction drawn by Perelman (esp. p.101) between "judicial
proof," which is "concerned only with fact," and "juridical proof," which is concerned with interpretation of
the law.
^ υμ άς δέ χρή, γιγνώσκοντας ότι ημείς μέν οι άντίδικοι κατ’ εύνοια ν κρίνοντες τό
πράγμα εικότως δίκαια έκάτεροι αυτούς οίόμεθα λέγειν, υμάς δέ όσίως όρα ν προσήκει τα
πραχθέντα* εκ των λεγομένων γάρ ή αλήθεια σκεπτέα αυτών έστίν.
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good and bad, so the two opposed claims in this case collapse into a larger truth that both the
thrower and the victim (and perhaps the trainers and others as well) are responsible in some sense.
The truth of the Second Tetralogy is thus a complex logos about the complexity o f shared
responsibility.
It is now time, at last, to turn to the work entitled Truth. The starting point for my
interpretation of this work is Morrison's study of fr. 1 DK ,17 which reads, according to his vastly
improved text: εν τφ λέγοντι ουδέ γε νους εις, εν τε ούδέν α ύτφ ούτε ων δψ ει όρα (ο
όρώ)ν μακρότατα ούτε ων γνώμη γιγνώ σκει δ μακρότατα γιγνώσκων" ("Someone who
says one thing does not in fact have one thing in mind, nor is there for him one thing, neither any
of those things the one who sees best sees with his sight nor any of those things the one who
knows best knows with his mind"). Morrison follows Galen in understanding the importance of
this statement to lie in the opposition between cognition and sense perception implied in the
neither/nor expression at the end. He also understands that the sentence makes a claim about
language: a single logos does not correspond to either a single thought or a single perception. This
is the important point for us: someone who speaks a single logos has more than one thing in mind
and more than one thing in reality corresponds to that logos.
O f course, even if we were certain of Morrison's text,18 we could hardly be certain o f their
meaning without more context. I suggest, however, that in this statement Antiphon had in mind the
complexity of things (ta pragm ata) and the corresponding complexity o f logoi. The work which
this statement introduces, then, might contain not a single unequivocal statement of a truth, such as
that physis is more real or truer than nom os, but a complex logos, perhaps one that sees some
truth in both nom os and physis. The overall truth o f the Truth might then be found in the
dialectical tension between these individual truths.
Before turning to the papyrus fragments, let me note one other fragment that may come
from Truth : "Men consider things they see with their sight more credible (pistotera) than things
for which examination o f the truth (ho elenchos tés alêtheias) leads into the unseen
(aphanes)."19 This fragment is not usually assigned to Truth , and Morrison's arguments for the
assignment are weak, but the fragment may come from this work. W ith regard to the two kinds of
truth we have been discussing, the truth that is here said to be examined could be factual truth or
interpretative truth.20 In both the First and Second Tetralogies the truth is not apparent, though for
different reasons, and the fragment could be imagined as part o f the argument in either one.
With these rather speculative possibilities in mind, I turn to the papyrus fragments.211 shall
focus on three examples o f ambiguous truth, namely the relationship between nature (physis) and
law (nomos), the relationship between Greek and Barbarian, and the idea o f justice.
1.
Antiphon discusses physis and nom os primarily in 44B. I do not want to repeat the
views of earlier scholars on this question, which have been well summarized by Ostwald's recent
treatment. I agree generally with the line of thought suggested by Kerferd and others, that
Antiphon is not an unequivocal supporter of physis, though I do not accept Kerferd's hypothesis

17 See "The Truth o f Antiphon," p. 40.
18 Morrison's text and interpretation are accepted by, e.g., Guthrie, p. 202-3.
19 o i γαρ άνθρωποι αττα α ν όρώσι τη δψει πιστότερα ηγούνται ή οις εις αφ ανές ηκει δ
έλεγχος της άληθείας. The translation is Morrison's. DK do not include this fragment, and Thalheim
assigns it to a speech o f the orator (fir. 35), but Morrison (in Sprague, p. 214) assigns it to Truth, arguing
that the last two words are not part o f Antiphon's text but are intended to assign the fragment to Truth. This
seems unlikely, but even without an indication of provenance, it is possible that the fragment comes from
Truth. The traditional assignment to a speech o f the orator on behalf of Myrros is not secure either.
20 The same expression "examination of the truth" occurs in Ant. 5.35 (the Murder o f Herodes),
where, as in the First Tetralogy, the issue is one of fact and there is a similar mix o f questionable direct
evidence and arguments from likelihood.
2 1 1 shall use the numeration 44 A, 44B, and 44C, established by Decleva Caizzi in her
authoritative publication o f the papyrus fragments. These fragments are traditionally numbered 44B, 44 A,
and 44 (or 44C).

-

6

-

that Antiphon is merely examining the views o f others. Rather, Antiphon is assessing the
advantages and disadvantages o f both nomos and physis. To quote Ostwald (p. 303), "It rather
looks as if Antiphon's theme was to delineate the advantages that accrue to a human being from
following, respectively, the dictates of society and those o f nature. Partial truth is to be found in
both."
Even making allowances for the fragmentary nature o f our text, it is hard to see any
systematic treatment o f nomos and physis in Antiphon's remarks. Statements are made,
especially in the first two columns o f 44B, that appear to associate truth or reality only with nature,
but other statements cast doubt on such a conclusion. Indeed, the only unequivocal value assumed
in this section is what is advantageous (xumferon) to a person. Sometimes it is more
advantageous to follow nomos, sometimes physis.
The association of truth with physis is clearest when Antiphon contrasts the harm that
comes from violating nomos as harm dia doxan (harm that comes from the negative opinions of
others) with the harm from violating physis which is harm di' alêtheian (col. 2). This contrast
between nomos and physis continues with examples o f how "most things that are ju st according
to law are inimical (polemios) to nature." Later (in col. 5) Antiphon's adds other examples o f
conduct "inimical to nature" in that they "involve more pain when less is possible"; he cites
specifically such conduct as defending oneself only when attacked and treating one's parents well
despite being mistreated by them. But it is not clear that Antiphon is is giving a blanket
endorsement to such behavior, despite the additional pain associated with it. In column 6 he
criticizes the current system of justice for not being effective, but this is not the same as advocating
a simple return to the dictates of physis.
There are other indications that Antiphon's point is not to contrast the true advantage/harm
of nature with the false advantage/harm of law, but rather to emphasize that the latter is dependent
on the recognition of others in the society. The harm that comes dia doxan may be just as true, in
the sense of corresponding to real harm, as that which comes from nature. Thus both physis and
nomos may have some value. The seemingly clear opposition between the two begins to break
down particularly in column 3, where we learn that the advantage o f living and the disadvantage of
dying both belong to nature. We also learn that, "according to a correct account" (orthói ge
logôi) pain and pleasure are equally helpful to nature and equally advantageous (presumably to
humans), "for things that are in truth advantageous m ust not harm but must benefit." Not only do
these statements call into question the unequivocal beneficence of nature; they also suggest that the
truth, at least with regard to what is advantageous, may be more complex than commonly
assumed. It appears, then, that in fragment 44B Antiphon is raising questions about or
demonstrating inconsistencies in current views about nomos and physis, harm and benefit, and
advantage and disadvantage, without (as far as we can tell) reaching any definite conclusion in his
own views.
Such an attitude may also be suggested by the phrase orthos logos. Protagoras is said to
have spent a day with Pericles discussing a legal situation very similar to that o f the Second
Tetralogy in order to determine who was guilty (the youth, the officials, or the javelin itself)
"according to the most correct account" (kata ton orthotaton logon). The criteria for
determining the most correct account are not stated, but on the analogy o f the Second Tetralogy, it
is possible that the most correct account involved some sort o f dialectical tension between two or
more different accounts, a logos that ultimately implicated all three suspects. Thus in the contest
between two or more different logoi, the most correct logos is not necessarily any of the
individual competing logoi. Similarly, in this fragment o f Truth , the correct account seems to be
one that both asserts and questions the association of physis with truth, reality and advantage. I
make this tentative suggestion fully aware that the gaps and the fragmentary context make it
hazardous to draw any conclusion about Antiphon's overall meaning. But it is certainly a serious
possibility that his overall assessment o f physis is intentionally ambiguous.
2.
Ambiguity is also present in 44A, where Antiphon says, "we have become barbarians
toward each other, when by nature we are all created similarly in all respects to be both Barbarians
and Greeks." The first half of this statement clearly implies two opposing theses. On the one hand,
Greeks and Barbarians are different. The very names imply that these are two different categories,
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and the verb bebarbarôm etha clearly implies that Barbarians (as opposed to Greeks) have a
certain identifiable, and negatively valued, character.22 The difference between Greek and
Barbarian may also be supported by the contrast between their laws, which was probably
mentioned at the beginning of the first sentence, though this is now missing.
On the other hand, Antiphon is asserting that Greeks and Barbarians are identical (πάντα
πάντες ομοίως); and their identity is further supported by "the necessary attributes o f nature,"
which are spelled out in the following sentence. Breathing, laughing, and the rest provide no
grounds for distinguishing between these two categories, (now fragmentary). Antiphon's point is
not simply that Greeks and Barbarians are similar by physis and different by nom os (if that is a
point here), but also that Greeks are both different from Barbarians and also identical with them.
Here too the truth is a complex combination o f two opposed logoi.
3.
The third ambiguity involves the definitions o f justice in 44C. Antiphon demonstrates
that two popular understandings of justice-justice as not harming anyone who has not harmed
you, and justice as obedience to the city's laws—lead to conflicting results. More specifically,
behavior demanded by the city's system o f justice (examples o f which are given in 44B) results in
unjust behavior according to the "not doing harm" rule o f justice. There is no indication that
Antiphon intends his paradox to be an indictment of the city's justice. It would be odd indeed if the
ultimate conclusion of a work entitled Truth was the condemnation as "unjust" o f the common
requirement of the law that a witness tell the truth. It seems unlikely, moreover, that Antiphon
would urge witnesses to give false testimony in order to protect their friends, since he could surely
argue that the lie that avoids harming a friend or a neutral party would in at least some cases surely
hurt someone else who has not hurt the witness.
It is frustrating for modem scholars not to know how this fragment continued, but in
addition to pointing out contradictions or inadequacies in the city's system o f justice. Antiphon
would surely have had little difficulty in arguing that every action hurts someone who has not
himself done the agent any harm. It thus seems more likely that Antiphon's purpose is to point to
ambiguities and contradictions in our thinking about justice. Conduct that is just in one regard is
unjust in another, and neither of the two definitions of justice proposed is entirely valid. This is the
most likely conclusion to be drawn from the statement (col. 2) that either one o f the two definitions
is unjust or they both are. Both are in some ways unjust, but also in some ways just. And any
ultimate "truth" about justice would probably have to include aspects o f both.
The truth o f Antiphon's Truth is thus a complex and ambiguous discourse about a complex
and ambiguous world, involving both correspondence and coherence. As in the Second Tetralogy
we can see Antiphon manipulating different arguments and looking for suggestive contradictions
that will illuminate some of the obscurities o f this world. Plato, o f course, was horrified at the
possibility that the truth might be ambiguous or that contradictory statements might both contain an
element of truth. He took the sophists' claims to be a complete perversion o f the notion o f truth and
argued that "Protagoras' Truth is true to nobody" (Tht. 171C) and that, as discussed above, the
rhetoricians honored probabilities more highly than truth ( Phdr. 267A, 272D-273C). But Plato's
criticisms, especially on points about which he felt strongly, are certainly not a valid guide to the
thinking o f the sophists.
One last speculation: it seems clear from the preserved fragments o f Antiphon's other main
sophistic work. Concord, that this was quite different from Truth, and many scholars have
speculated on the difference. Nestle went so far as to ascribe Truth and the Tetralogies to the
sophist and Concord and the three courtroom speeches to the orator. More typical of modem views
is Cole's idea (p. 100) that Truth pushes a radical critique of social order, while Concord may have
been a companion piece that pushed the advantages o f social harmony. My own speculation along
somewhat different lines is that Truth proposed the complex and ambiguous truth I have just
outlined, whereas Concord contained those statements o f popular wisdom that on the surface, at
least, seem unambiguous, or at least statements whose ambiguity Antiphon decided not to explore.

22 Cf. Eur. Orestes 485-86.
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Concord presents the consensus o f non-competing logoi; Truth, on the other hand, is at
war with itself, as Antiphon explores the contradictions o f the world as he sees i t And this very
logos about contradictions is itself a Truth.
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